We analyze how different rules for exiting an alliance (simple majority, unanimity or unanimity with side payments) will affect the formation of strategic alliances. We find that no alliance structure is contractually stable under the simple majority rule. Once unanimous consent is required, asymmetric alliance structures consisting of two alliances are contractually stable. In addition, the grand alliance which is the efficient structure is stable. Allowing for side payments to compensate former partners improves efficiency. Finally, we show that different rules of exit may coexist in different alliances in the long run.
Introduction
A common practice for firms is to pool their expertise in partnerships such as joint ventures and strategic alliances. 1 Strategic alliances refer to agreements characterized by the commitment of two or more firms to reach a common goal entailing the pooling of their ressources and activities. The formation of an alliance usually creates negative externalities for nonmembers.
We analyze how dierent rules for exiting an alliance will aect the formation of strategic alliances. Alliances agreements contain mechanisms to regulate exit. Three rules of exit are commonly used in alliances: (i) exit without breach via a deadlock implemented by the contractual board where only unanimous decisions are taken (a unanimity decision rule), 2 (ii) exit via breach of the agreement subject to damages (a unanimity decision rule with side payments), (iii) exit at the will of the larger party subject to forewarning (a simple majority decision rule). 3 We adopt the concept of contractual stability to predict the alliances that are going to emerge at equilibrium. A new partner enters an alliance only if she wishes to come in, her new partners wish to accept her, and she obtains the consent from her former partners to withdraw if she was before member of another alliance. Under the unanimity rule, she needs the consent of all members of her initial alliance. Under the simple majority rule, she needs the consent of at least half of the members of her initial alliance. Under the unanimity rule with side payments, she still needs the unanimous consent of her former partners but she can now make side payments to her former partners in order to reach their approval. Side payments can only be made to members of the initial alliance she wants to leave.
1 Hagedoorn (2002) has reported that in 2000 there were 199 strategic alliances in the biotechnology industry out of 575 strategic alliances counted overall, making biotechnology the first industry in the ranking followed by the information technology (184 alliances) and automotive (53 alliances). 2 The contractual board is assigned the task of monitoring the alliance activities and shaping ongoing developments. The contractual board is comprised of representatives of each side, usually in equal numbers, but the absolute numbers are not so important, since unanimity is the norm.
Given that alliances usually do not provide for easy dissolution, the deadlocks are dealt with according to the terms of the contracts, which ordinarily include a dispute resolution mechanism.
See Smith (2005) . 3 Forewarning is usually required for an alliance agreement to be terminable at the will of the larger party. We investigate in Bloch's (1995) model of associations of firms whether requiring the consent of former partners may help to sustain the emergence of more ecient alliances in the long run. We find that there is no contractually stable alliance structure under the simple majority decision rule when the industry consists of more than seven firms. Hence, no alliance structure can be stable without requiring any consent of partners to exit. However, any asymmetric alliance structure consisting of two alliances becomes contractually stable once the unanimity decision rule is adopted.
Requiring the consent of all partners to exit reverts to give each partner a veto power to any change made to the alliance. As a consequence, from any asymmetric alliance structure consisting of two alliances, we have that (i) any deviation where an alliance is divided in two or more alliances is now blocked, (ii) any deviation to the grand alliance is blocked, and (iii) any deviation where some members of the smallest alliance leave their alliance to join the largest one is now blocked. Moreover, the grand alliance which is the ecient structure also becomes stable. If we allow for side payments only among former partners in addition to the unanimity rule, then some less ecient structures that were stable without side payments are no more stable. Hence, allowing for side payments and requiring unanimity to exit helps to improve eciency. The grand alliance remains contractually stable. Finally, we
show that dierent rules of exit may coexist in dierent alliances at equilibrium. For instance, the asymmetric alliance structure where half-plus-one of the total number of firms are in one alliance and all other firms are in a second alliance is contractually stable when simple majority is in eect in the first alliance while unanimity is in eect in the second alliance.
Joining an alliance requires the unanimous consent of all current members of the alliance. Obviously, a dierent rule for joining an alliance could lead to dierent predictions about stable alliance structures. In the open membership game, all firms simultaneously announce a message and alliances are then formed by all firms who have announced the same message. In fact, any firm can form an alliance with another firm simply by announcing the same message. Yi (1997) has shown that the only Nash equilibrium of the open membership game is the grand alliance. Once firms are asymmetric, the grand alliance may not be a Nash equilibrium outcome of the game.
See also Yi and Shin (2000) .
However, there is no strong Nash equilibrium of the open membership game. Bloch (1995) has proposed a sequential game for forming associations of firms. One firm proposes an alliance. All the prospective members of the alliance respond in turn to the oer. If all the firms accept to join the alliance, the proposed alliance is formed and all members benefit from the reduction in marginal cost. If one of the firms does not accept to join the alliance, the proposed alliance is not formed and the firm that did not accept becomes the firm that makes a proposal in the next period.
Bloch has shown that in equilibrium, firms form two asymmetric alliances, with the largest one comprising roughly three-quarters of industry members.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the model. In Section 3 we introduce the notion of contractual stability and we provide results that are independent of the rule for consent. In Section 4 we show that there is no alliance structure that is stable under the simple majority decision rule. In Section 5 we characterize the stable alliance structures under the unanimity decision rule. In Section 6 we introduce side payments. In Section 7 we allow dierent alliances to use dierent rules for consent. In Section 8 we conclude.
Strategic Alliances of Firms
Cooperation among competing firms is increasingly common on oligopolistic markets. More and more often, competing firms agree to share information, build common facilities or launch common research programmes in order to decrease their production costs. Bloch (1995) proposed a simple model to analyze the formation of alliances of firms where the benefits from cooperation increase linearly in the size of the alliance.
Consider a market with n symmetric firms indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., n, where n  4. The interactions among firms are modelled as a two-stage game. In stage one, alliances are formed. In stage two, given the alliance structure, firms compete on the market. Once alliances are formed, firms behave as competitors on the market and maximize individual profits. Demand is linear and given by p =    n i=1 q i , where  measures the absolute size of the market. Firms have a constant marginal cost of production, which is decreasing in the size of the alliance they belong to.
Formally, the cost of a firm i in an alliance A of size a is given by c i =   µ a. The parameters ,  and µ are chosen in such a way that, for any alliance structure, all firms are active in a Cournot equilibrium. Once alliances are formed on the market, firms select non-cooperatively the quantities they oer on the market. Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of firms. An alliance structure S = {A 1 , A 2 , ..., A m } is a partition of the set of firms such that A i  A j =  for i  = j and  m i=1 A i = N . Let s be the cardinality of S (i.e. the number of alliances in S). An alliance structure A is symmetric if and only if a i = a j for all A i , A j  S. Let S  = {N } be the grand alliance.
For any given alliance structure S = {A 1 , A 2 , ..., A m }, one can easily show that there exists a unique Cournot equilibrium on the market, and that each firm's profit
is a monotonically increasing function of the following valuation,
where a(i) denotes the size of the alliance firm i belongs to. In fact,
Contractual Stability
A simple way to analyze the alliances that one might expect to emerge in the long run is to examine a sort of equilibrium requirement that no group of firms benefits from altering the alliance structure. What about possible deviations? An alliance Once identified all possible deviations from an existing alliance structure, different stability concepts could be studied. We adopt the concept of contractual stability to predict the alliances that are going to emerge at equilibrium. As in Drèze and Greenberg (1980), we assume that alliances are contracts binding all members and that modifying an alliance requires the consent of the members of the alliance. That is, a new partner will enter an alliance only if she wishes to come in, her new partners wish to accept her, and she obtains from her former partners permission to withdraw (only if she was before member of another alliance).
We analyze two dierent decision rules for consent: the simple majority decision rule and the unanimity decision rule. Both rules reflect rules of exit used in alliances:
exit at the will of the larger party subject to forewarning and exit without breach via a deadlock implemented by the contractual board where only unanimous decisions are taken. Definition 1. An alliance structure S is contractually stable under the unanimity decision rule if for any A  N , S  obtainable from S via A and i  A such that
Under the unanimity decision rule, the move from an alliance structure S to any obtainable alliance structure S  needs the consent of every deviating firm and the consent of every member of the initial alliances of the deviating firms. Then, an alliance structure is contractually stable under the unanimity decision rule if any deviating firm or any member of the former alliances of the deviating firms is not better o from the deviation to any obtainable alliance structure S  .
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Definition 2. An alliance structure S is contractually stable under the simple majority decision rule if for any A  N , S  obtainable from S via A and i  A such
Under the simple majority decision rule, the move from an alliance structure S to any obtainable alliance structure S  needs the consent of every deviating firm and the consent of more than half members of each initial alliance of the deviating firms. Then, an alliance structure S is contractually stable under the simple majority 6 Firms are not farsighted in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their decision rule if any deviating firm or at least half members of some former alliance of the deviating firms are not better o from the deviation to any obtainable alliance structure S  .
Obviously, an alliance structure that is contractually stable under the simple majority decision rule is contractually stable under the unanimity decision rule. In fact each decision rule requires the consent of partners above some proportion for a deviation not to be blocked. Let q denote the proportion of partners whose consent is needed for a deviation not to be blocked, 0  q  1. For instance, the simple majority decision rule reverts to a proportion q > 1/2 while the unanimity decision rule reverts to a proportion q = 1. The relationship between contractual stability under any decision rule embodied by a proportion q is obvious: a proportion q  < q refines stability. That is, the set of contractually stable alliance structures under q  is (weakly) included in the set of contractually stable alliance structures under q.
Indeed, the probability to block a deviation is greater the higher the proportion q.
When the proportion approaches zero (q  0), membership has no matter in terms of consent and the concept of contractual stability reverts to Hart and Kurz (1983) notion of -stability.
We first provide some general results about stable alliance structures independently of the decision rule. Lemma 1 tells us that any two alliances have always incentives to merge if both alliance sizes are smaller than (n + 1)/2.
and a 2 < (n + 1)/2.
Proof. Consider the incentives for the members of an alliance A 1 to merge with an alliance A 2 when no other deviation occurs in the alliance structure. This is
the alliance structure formed by merging A 1 and A 2 in S and i is any member of Lemma 1 implies that alliance structures consisting of more than two alliances cannot be contractually stable whatever the decision rule for consent since there always exists two alliances having a size smaller than (n + 1)/2.
Lemma 2. Any alliance structure S such that s > 2 is never contractually stable whatever the decision rule for consent.
Proof. Take any alliance structure S such that s > 2. Then, there exists at least two alliances A 1  S and A 2  S such that a 1 < (n + 1)/2 and a 2 < (n + 1)/2.
From Lemma 1 we have that all members of A 1 and A 2 have incentives to merge;
and this merger does not request the consent of any other firm than those involved in the merger.
Lemma 1 also implies that any symmetric alliance structure consisting of two alliances cannot be contractually stable since both alliances have a size smaller than
Lemma 3. The symmetric alliance structure S such that s = 2 is never contractually stable whatever the decision rule for consent.
Proof. Take the symmetric alliance structure S = {A 1 , A 2 } where a 1 = a 2 = n/2.
Thus, a 1 = a 2 < (n + 1)/2, and from Lemma 1, we have that all members of A 1 and A 2 have incentives to merge; and this merger does not request the consent of any other firm than those involved in the merger.
Simple Majority Decision Rule
We now analyze the stability of alliances when the exit of an alliance requires the consent of a majority of the members of the alliance. We already know that the only candidates for being stable are asymmetric alliance structures consisting of two alliances and the grand alliance structure.
First, we show that asymmetric alliance structures consisting of two alliances cannot be contractually stable under the simple majority decision rule. Take any asymmetric alliance structure S = {A, N \ A}. If the size of the largest alliance in Lemma 4. Any asymmetric alliance structure S such that s = 2 is never contractually stable under the simple majority decision rule for n big enough (n  8).
Proof. Take any asymmetric alliance structure consisting of two alliances, S =
We will show that there always exists a group of firms B belonging to N \ A (B  N \ A) who has incentives to leave N \ A to join the alliance A. That is, we consider the deviation from S = {A, N \A} to S  = {AB, (N \A)\B}. We will show that all members of A and B prefer S  to S and that this deviation is not blocked by former partners of B in N \A according to the simple majority rule. For all i  AB, Second, we show that the grand alliance structure cannot be contractually stable under the simple majority decision rule. In fact, there always exists a majority of firms in N (i.e. 2a > n) who has incentives to leave their partners in N to form a new alliance A.
Lemma 5. The grand alliance S  = {N } is never contractually stable under the simple majority decision rule (for n > 3).
7 For a > (3n  1)/4, there is no positive b that will make members of A accepting the deviation from S to S  . However, when (2n  1)/3 < a  (3n  1)/4, the b members that are accepted by A are not suciently large to be a majority in N \ A. 8 For n = 3, {N } is the unique contractually stable alliance structure under the simple majority decision rule. For 4  n  5, there is a unique contractually stable alliance structure under the simple majority decision rule: {A, N \A} with a = n1. For n = 6, the unique contractually stable alliance structures under the simple majority decision rule are {A, N \ A} with n  2  a  n  1.
For n = 7, the unique contractually stable alliance structures under the simple majority decision rule are {A, N \ A} with a = n  2.
Proof. We will show that, from the grand alliance {N }, there always exists a group of firms A of N (A  N ) who has incentives to leave N . That is, we consider the deviation from S  = {N } to S  = {A, N \ A}. We will show that (i) all members of A prefer S  to S  ; (ii) this deviation is not blocked by former partners, that is, members of N \ A. Take A such that the size of the alliance A, i.e. a, is the integer closest to (3n + 1)/4. If two integers are equally close to (3n + 1)/4, the alliance size can take on those two values. Two conditions are required so that this deviation is not blocked.
(a) Members of A who deviate need to have the majority within N . Since the size of A is the integer closest to (3n + 1)/4, we have that n/2 < a.
(b) Members of A have to be better o in
Since the size of A is the integer closest to (3n + 1)/4 and n  4,
Using Lemma 2 to Lemma 5 we conclude that there is no contractually stable alliance structure under the simple majority rule when the size of the industry is not too small.
Proposition 1.
There is no contractually stable alliance structure under the simple majority rule for n  8.
Since an alliance structure that is -stable under Hart and Kurz (1983) notion of stability is contractually stable under the simple majority decision rule, we have that there is no -stable alliance structure.
Corollary 1.
There is no -stable alliance structure for n  8.
Unanimity Decision Rule
We now analyze the stability of alliances when the exit of an alliance requires the consent of all members of the alliance. We show that, once each partner can veto any change made to the alliance, then any asymmetric alliance structure consisting of two alliances becomes contractually stable. Lemma 6 tells us that, from any alliance structure consisting of two or more alliances, any deviation where an alliance is divided in two or more alliances is blocked under the unanimity rule.
Lemma 6. Take any alliance structure S  = S  . Then, any deviation from S to S  where an alliance A  S is divided into two (or more) alliances is blocked under the unanimity decision rule.
Proof. Take any alliance structure S  = S  . The deviation from S to S  = S \ {A}  {A 1 , A 2 } with A 1  A 2 = A is blocked because (i) at least one of the new alliances A 1 or A 2 has a size strictly smaller than (n +1)/2 and so, by Lemma 1, the members of this alliance are worse o in S  than in S, and (ii) unanimity of members of A is required.
Lemma 7 tells us that, from any asymmetric alliance structure consisting of two alliances, any deviation to the grand alliance structure is blocked under the unanimity rule.
Lemma 7. Take any asymmetric alliance structure S with s = 2. Then, any deviation from S to S  is blocked under the unanimity decision rule.
. Take any asymmetric alliance structure S = {A, N \ A}. Without loss of generality, let a 
Comparing those expressions and given that a  (n + 1)/2, members of A block the deviation from S = {A, N \ A} to S  = {N } because they are not better o in S
Lemma 8 tells us that, from any asymmetric alliance structure consisting of two alliances, any deviation where some members of the smallest alliance leave their alliance to join the largest alliance is blocked under the unanimity rule.
Lemma 8. Take any asymmetric alliance structure S = {A, N \ A} with a  n  1.
Then, any deviation from S = {A, N \A} to S  = {AB, (N \A)\B} with B  N \A is blocked under the unanimity decision rule.
Proof. [Case 1.] Suppose that (n + 1)/2  a  n  1.
Take any asymmetric alliance structure S = {A, N \ A} and consider the devia-
. Thus, members of
and only if (n  1  4a)/2 < b. This condition is always satisfied since (n + 1)/2  a.
[Case 2.] Suppose that a < (n + 1)/2.
we have
Thus, each i  (N \ A) \ B blocks the deviation if and only if (n  1  4a)/2 < b.
, and
i  B has incentives to deviate if and only if b(3n+14a)2b 2 (n2a)(n+1) > 0.
. Thus, each i  A has incentives to accept members of B if and only if 3n + 1  4a  2b > 0. 
But then the condition for i  (N \ A) \ B to block the deviation from S to S  is satisfied. That is, we have that
Using Lemma 6 to Lemma 8 we have that any asymmetric alliance structure consisting of two alliances is contractually stable under the unanimity decision rule since all possible profitable deviations are blocked.
Proposition 2. Any asymmetric alliance structure S such that s = 2 is contractu-ally stable under the unanimity decision rule.
Moreover, once the exit of an alliance requires the consent of all members of the alliance, the grand alliance which is the ecient structure becomes contractually stable.
Proposition 3. The grand alliance S  = {N } is always contractually stable under the unanimity decision rule.
Proof. The grand alliance S  = {N } is the ecient alliance structure. We have that
Under the unanimity decision rule, any deviation from S  to any S requires the approval of all members of N . Therefore, any deviation from S  to any S is blocked by at least one member of N who will be worse o in S than in S  .
We now compare the outcomes obtained under the notion of contractual stability with those obtained under a sequential game of coalition formation proposed by Bloch (1996) . 9 A fixed protocol is assumed and the sequential game proceeds as follows. Firm 1 proposes the formation of an alliance A 1 to which she belongs.
Each prospective firm answers the proposal in the order fixed by the protocol. If one prospective firm rejects the proposal, then she makes a counter-proposal to which she belongs. If all prospective firms accept, then the alliance A 1 is formed.
All firms in A 1 withdraw from the game, and the game proceeds among the firms belonging to N \ A 1 . This sequential game has an infinite horizon, but the firms do not discount the future. The firms who do not reach an agreement in finite time receive a payo of zero. Once some firms have agreed to form an alliance they are committed to remain in that alliance. Bloch (1995) has shown that the inecient alliance structure S = {A  , N \ A  } where of a dominant alliance grouping around three quarters (i.e. a  is the integer closest to (3n + 1)/4) of the industry forms and the remaining firms form a smaller alliance is the unique symmetric stationary perfect equilibrium outcome of the sequential game. Contractual stability under the unanimity decision rule not only sustains this inecient alliance structure but also stabilizes the ecient grand alliance. 9 See also Ray and Vohra (1999) .
Beside exit at the will of the larger party subject to forewarning (simple majority rule) and exit without breach via a deadlock implemented by the contractual board where only unanimous decisions are taken (unanimity rule), a third rule is commonly used in alliances to govern exit: exit via breach of the agreement subject to damages.
This third rule can be modelled by allowing for side payments among partners in addition to the unanimity decision rule.
Definition 4. An alliance structure S is contractually stable under side payments and the unanimity decision rule if for any A  N , S  obtainable from S via A and
When a group of firms deviate by leaving some alliance, they can now compensate their former partners to obtain their consent. Obviously, an alliance structure that is contractually stable under the unanimity decision rule with side payments is contractually stable under the unanimity decision rule without side payments.
Proposition 4.
Allowing for side payments among partners, the contractually stable alliance structures under the unanimity decision rule are (i) any asymmetric alliance structure S = {A, N \A} with (3n1)/4 < a  n1.
(ii) the grand alliance structure S  = {N }.
Proof. First, we show that the b members of B can compensate the n  a  b members of (N \ A) \ B when they deviate jointly with members of A from S =
where
and
Then, any asymmetric alliance structure S = {A, N \ A} is still contractually stable even if it is possible to compensate former partners. Indeed, some members of A would like to drop some partners but they cannot compensate those partners to reach their consent. Finally, the grand alliance structure remains contractually stable because it is ecient and all firms belong to the same alliance (hence, each firm can veto any change to the alliance structure).
We now illustrate our main results by means of an example with eight firms. In Table 1 we give the payos for    = 42 and µ = 1. We make a slight abuse of notation. For instance, {5, 2, 1} should not be interpreted as a single alliance structure but as the alliance structures, composed by three alliances of size 5, 2 and 1, that can be formed by eight firms. The alliance structure {5, 3} is no more contractually stable once side payments are allowed since the deviation to {7, 1}
is not blocked because the two firms that are changing of alliance can compensate their former partner. Notice that {5, 3} is the less ecient structure among the contractually stable ones under the unanimity rule without side payments. Hence, allowing for side payments and requiring unanimity helps to improve eciency. In addition, the ecient structure {8} is still stable but is never the outcome of Bloch's sequential game of coalition formation that selects {6, 2}. Table 1 : The 8-firm case with    = 42, µ = 1, and all payos in 1/9-th's.
Heterogeneous Decision Rules
We now consider the case where alliances may have dierent rules of exit: either the simple majority decision rule (q m ) or the unanimity decision rule (q u ).
We denote by S = {(A, q u ), (N \ A, q m )} an alliance structure where, in alliance A, the rule of exit is the unanimity decision rule while, in alliance N \ A, the rule of exit is the simple majority rule. Which alliance structures are now contractually stable?
Obviously, any asymmetric alliance structure S = {(A, q u ), (N \ A, q u )} is still contractually stable and the grand alliance structure S  = {(N, q u )} is contractually stable too. (ii) any asymmetric alliance structure S = {(A, q m ), (N \ A, q u )} with n/2 < a  (n + 3)/2.
10 For the equilibrium binding agreements game of Ray and Vohra (1997) , the most concentrated stable alliance structure in our model is {(n + 3)/2, (n  3)/2} (see Yi, 1997) . It reverts to {5, 3}
in our example with eight firms. Moreover, none of the contractually stable alliances with side payments are stable in the equilibrium binding agreements game.
Proof. From the above analysis we have that the alliance structures with dierent rules that could be contractually stable are any asymmetric alliance structure S =
First, we consider any asymmetric alliance structure S = {(A, q u ), (N \ A, q m )}.
Suppose that n/2 < a  (2n  1)/3. We know from the proof of Lemma 4 that there always exists a group of firms B belonging to N \ A (B  N \ A) who has incentives to leave N \ A to join the alliance A such that (i) all members of A and 
Hence, each i  (N \ A) \ B blocks the deviation if and only if (n  1  4a)/2 < b.
This condition is always satisfied since n/2 < a. Finally, we need to check that there are no incentives for A   A to move from S = {(A, q m ), (N \ A, q u )} to
This deviation is profitable for members of A  if and only if 1  b < a  (n + 1)/2. Thus, for (n + 3)/2 < a  (2n  1)/3 this deviation is not blocked and S = {(A, q m ), (N \ A, q u )} is not contractually stable; but for n/2 < a  (n + 3)/2 the deviation is blocked and
Asymmetric alliance structures {(A, q u ), (N \ A, q m )} where the size of A is not too large and the unanimity rule is in eect in A are not contractually stable since the profitable deviation for a majority of members of N \ A to join the alliance A is not blocked. Once the size of A becomes large, there is a profitable deviation for a majority of firms in A to reduce the size of their alliance by excluding some partners, but those targeted partners can veto any change made to the alliance thanks to the unanimity rule in eect in A. Hence, any asymmetric alliance structure S = {(A, q u ), (N \ A, q m )} with (2n  1)/3 < a  n  1 is contractually stable.
Moreover, any asymmetric alliance structure {(A, q m ), (N \ A, q u )} with n/2 < a  (n + 3)/2 is contractually stable when simple majority is in eect in the largest alliance while unanimity is in eect in the smallest one. When the size of A becomes larger then the deviation where a majority of A excludes some partners is not 
Conclusion
We have analyze how dierent rules for exiting an alliance (simple majority, unanimity or unanimity with side payments) aect the formation of strategic alliances.
No alliance structure is contractually stable under the simple majority rule. Once unanimous consent is required, asymmetric alliance structures consisting of two alliances are contractually stable. In addition, the grand alliance (which is the ecient structure) is stable. Allowing for side payments to compensate former partners improves eciency. Finally, we have shown that dierent rules of exit may coexist in dierent alliances in the long run Minehart and Neeman (1999) have analyzed two termination contracts that are widely used in practice (the shotgun rule and price competition) to dissolve partnerships. Under the shotgun rule (also known as the Texas Shootout), one partner proposes a price and the other decides whether to buy or sell at that price. Under the price competition, both partners submit bids and the high bidder buys the shares of the low bidder at a price equal to the higher bid. Minehart and Neeman have evaluated the performance of each termination contract to achieve the success of the partnership. They have found that although these contracts do not achieve full eciency, they both perform well. 11 While rules governing an alliance are mostly designed to guarantee the success of the alliance, we have shown that rules for exiting an alliance are important to determine the size and the number of alliances that will be formed in the industry.
An interesting extension is to allow for the existence of overlapping alliances. 
